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1  Introduction
That human activity is causing profound and potentially catastrophic 
climate change is no longer a matter of serious debate among climate 
scientists. By century end, average sea levels may rise as much as 2.5 m 
(8 ft.), displacing millions living on the coasts.1 Warming will exacer-
bate droughts, flooding, heat waves, and soil aridification, all of which 
seriously threaten agriculture. Zika, dengue, malaria, cholera, and other 
mosquito-borne illnesses will proliferate as hotter climates expand the 
insect’s range. Warmer winds and water portend more powerful and fre-
quent storms, and thus increased strains on critical infrastructure.
8
Allocating the Burdens of Climate Action: 
Consumption-Based Carbon Accounting 
and the Polluter-Pays Principle
Ross Mittiga
© The Author(s) 2019 
B. Edmondson and S. Levy (eds.), Transformative Climates and Accountable 
Governance, Palgrave Studies in Environmental Transformation, Transition  
and Accountability, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-97400-2_8
R. Mittiga (*) 
 Instituto de Ciencia Política, Pontificia Universidad Cat ólica de Chile, 
Santiago, Chile
e-mail: ross.mittiga@uc.cl
1National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration et al., 2017. Cf. IPCC, AR5, WG2, 
pp. 366, 368–369, which predicts 0.98 m.
158     R. Mittiga
Developing fair, effective, and accountable responses to these threats 
is essential. Central here is the question of how to allocate the costs of 
climate action among states (Page, 2011, p. 413).2 Indeed, for the last 
thirty years, this has been the question of climate politics at the inter-
national level. While virtually everyone agrees that the distribution of 
costs should be fair, there remains serious disagreement about what con-
stitutes fairness. This disagreement follows from a vague but critically 
important provision in the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (or UNFCCC), which holds that states ‘should protect the 
climate system … on the basis of equity and in accordance with their 
common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities’ 
(UNFCCC, 1992). Political leaders have exploited the ambiguity here, 
invoking fairness every time they find a policy or treaty too stringent 
for themselves, or not stringent enough for others. For example, after 
being criticized for its less-than-ambitious emissions targets, India—
the world’s third largest emitter of greenhouse gases (GHGs)—argued 
that (1) at least on certain metrics, Indians have contributed very little 
to the climate problem and (2) even if they are responsible in a collec-
tive sense, expecting further action would be unfair, insofar as it would 
impede their ability to achieve critical development gains.3 Of course, 
India is not the only country to advance claims like these: Many poor 
and developing states invoke a ‘right to grow’ or develop when pressed 
for greater climate action.
Wealthy, developed states likewise appeal to fairness to justify cli-
mate inaction—though their claims are clearly more duplicitous. The 
U.S. Senate, for instance, cited fairness as one of its reasons for refusing 
to ratify the Kyoto Protocol (Senate, 1997). More recently, President 
2Throughout, I assume that states are the relevant duty bearers. For a critical discussion of who 
should bear climate duties, see Caney (2005).
3Quoting directly: ‘Both in terms of cumulative global emissions and per capita emissions, India’s 
contribution to the problem of climate change is limited but its actions are fair and ambitious. 
… Nations that are now striving to fulfill the ‘right to grow’ of their teeming millions cannot be 
made to feel guilty [about] their development agenda’ (India’s Intended Nationally Determined 
Contribution, pp. 1, 33).
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Donald Trump invoked fairness concerns to defend withdrawing from 
the Paris Accord (Trump, 2017).4
The debate among states closely tracks scholarly debates over fairness 
in the context of climate change. Although this debate is still ongoing, 
climate ethicists have largely converged upon three main principles:
• The polluter-pays principle (PPP): Those responsible for causing cli-
mate change should pay, in proportion to their contribution.
• The ability-to-pay principle (APP): The wealthy should pay, in pro-
portion to their wealth.
• The beneficiary-pays principle (BPP): Those who have benefitted 
from activities that cause(d) climate change should pay, to the extent 
they have benefitted.
Of these, the PPP is widely regarded as the most intuitively plausible 
and well established in international environmental law (see Sect. 2). In 
recent years, however, scholars have subjected the PPP to extensive criti-
cism, for reasons examined in Sect. 3.
One avenue to resuscitate the PPP entails taking into account con-
sumption emissions—i.e., embedded in global trade flows. Although 
others have proposed adopting consumption-based emissions account-
ing, there has been no attempt to connect this change to the PPP—or 
any other distributive principle. Moreover, virtually no attention has 
been paid to the ethical justifications for holding consumers, rather 
than producers, responsible—a point addressed in Sect. 4. By adopting 
a consumption-based emissions accounting method, the resultant distri-
bution of burdens closely tracks economic capacity without resorting to 
problematic attributions of historical responsibility, as standard formu-
lations of the PPP do. This change also offers a way to address emerging 
problems such as carbon leakage.
4Specifically, Trump (2017) said: ‘The bottom line is that the Paris Accord is very unfair, at the 
highest level, to the United States. …I will work to ensure that America remains the world’s 
leader on environmental issues, but under a framework that is fair and where the burdens and 
responsibilities are equally shared among the many nations all around the world.’
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Before proceeding, it is helpful to explain what the ‘climate  burdens’ 
are that must be allocated. The literature typically elucidates two, 
though a third is increasingly recognized.5 First is the duty of mitiga-
tion, which involves reducing greenhouse gas emissions and enhanc-
ing natural ‘sinks,’ which absorb and store or convert emissions into 
non-insulating chemicals. We fulfill this duty by reducing energy 
usage or adopting carbon-free forms of energy production, support-
ing the development of green infrastructure (e.g., through technology 
transfers), consuming fewer animal products (Wellesley, Happer, & 
Froggatt, 2015, p. vii and passim; Steinfeld et al., 2006), travelling less 
in motorized vehicles (especially aircraft), preventing deforestation, and 
promoting afforestation.
A second duty is that of adaptation, which involves helping people 
(and perhaps other animals) adjust to climate changes.6 We fulfill this 
duty by promoting access to vaccinations, constructing seawalls, and 
developing infrastructure (like water pumps and levees) to manage 
flooding and drought (Eckersley, 2015).
Finally, there is the duty to provide compensation for the ‘adverse 
effects of climate change that cannot, or will not, be prevented through 
policies of mitigation or adaption’ (Page, 2016, p. 84).7 What this duty 
entails in practical terms remains controversial. At minimum, though, 
it requires the establishment of an international mechanism—like a 
risk-pooling insurance scheme (Arrow, Parikh, & Pillet, 1995, p. 72) 
or direct-aid fund—capable of providing support to states or people 
affected by climate change. The Warsaw Mechanism is a first step in this 
direction (James et al., 2014, p. 938).
Most agree that all three duties are essential. Mitigation is nec-
essary, for instance, to prevent the crossing of ‘nonlinear threshold 
points’ (Caney, 2010, p. 205; Gardiner, 2004, p. 562)—also known as 
7Specifically, policy-makers define loss as ‘negative impacts of climate change that are permanent’ 
and damage ‘as those impacts that can be reversed’ (Huq, Roberts, & Fenton, 2013).
5In particular, since the 18th Conference of the Parties (COP 18), in 2012.
6The IPCC defines adaptation as any ‘[a]djustment in natural or human systems in response to 
actual or expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial 
opportunities’ (IPCC, AR4, WG3, 18.1.2). See Jamieson (2010, pp. 265–266).
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‘tipping points’—‘beyond which major changes occur that may be self- 
reinforcing and are likely to be irreversible over relevant time scales’ 
(Furman et al., 2014, p. 20). Tipping points are unpredictable and 
very dangerous. Some tipping points, like the release of methane in the 
northern hemisphere’s (already thawing) permafrost, risk positive feed-
back cycles that could generate ‘runaway’ global warming.8 Given this, 
reducing emissions and enhancing sinks are essential; however, climate 
change has already progressed passed the point that all harmful changes 
can be avoided by mitigation alone. Because GHGs remain in the 
atmosphere long after they are released, even sharp emissions cuts now 
will not prevent global temperatures from continuing to rise well into 
the future (Caney, 2010, pp. 204–205). Adaptation is thus also neces-
sary to avoid grave threats to plant, animal, and human life. Yet, there 
are many climate changes and events that will exceed our anticipatory 
adaptation capacities; thus, establishing a compensation fund for losses 
and damages is also crucial.
Fulfilling these three duties is quite costly. On some estimates, for 
instance, effective mitigation alone would cost around $780 billion 
(in 2015 USD$) every year, for the foreseeable future (Stern, 2007, 
pp. 258–262).9 Hence our original question: according to which princi-
ple(s) should we allocate climate-action burdens? A satisfactory answer 
must be comprehensive—able to cover all three action burdens effec-
tively, now and into the future—and fair—sensitive to differences in 
states’ contributions to the problem and their differing capacities to deal 
with it. Anything less will fall short of the demands of accountable and 
effective climate governance.
In their standard formulations, none of the three principles cited 
above satisfy both of these desiderata. Yet, by reformulating the PPP to 
take account of emissions embodied in global trade flows, we can get 
close. Remaining shortcomings, outlined in Sect. 5, can be overcome by 
8One analysis suggests that a large-scale methane release could generate $60 trillion in damages 
(Wagner & Weitzman, 2016, p. 185).
9For similar estimates, see Stern (2010, p. 45), Weitzman (2007, p. 720), Nordhaus (2009, 
p. 90). For discussion, see Caney (2009, p. 182, n. 9), Page (2011, p. 412), and Rendall (2011, 
p. 890).
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supplementing the principle to produce a pluralist, bi-phasic theory of 
distributive climate justice that is fairer and more environmentally effec-
tive than alternatives.
2  The Polluter-Pays Principle
Many believe that those who cause harm or damage should (pay to) fix 
it (or compensate for any resultant suffering). Perhaps for this reason, 
the PPP is considered highly intuitive and has been a fixture of interna-
tional environmental law well before climate change was recognized as a 
major problem.10
The principle first appears in the climate-change context in Principle 
16 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, which 
states: ‘National authorities should endeavor to promote the internal-
ization of environmental costs and the use of economic instruments, 
taking into account the approach that the polluter should, in prin-
ciple, bear the cost of pollution.’ Notably, this formulation is (1) pres-
ent oriented11 and (2) focused primarily on reforming the behavior of 
economic actors. It calls on governments to require agents under their 
jurisdiction to include any negative environmental externalities in the 
price of their goods. This economistic formulation of the PPP is used 
widely. Nicholas Stern, for instance, argues that continued growth of 
greenhouse gas-emitting activities represents a major market failure, the 
main solution for which is to force agents to shoulder the social costs 
of their emissions by ‘[p]utting an appropriate price on carbon’ (Stern, 
2007, p. xviii). Notably, this way of formulating the PPP is present 
oriented, which simply means that it is focused on current pollution 
only—on taxing the GHGs being emitted in here and now (or at some 
regular interval, such as annually).
10An early example is the OECD’s 1972 Recommendation of the Council on Guiding Principles 
(OECD, 12). See also, Article 130R of the Maastricht Treaty, the Commission on Global 
Governance, and IPCC, AR5, WG3, 217–218, 318, 1268.
11While the literature commonly refers to principles focusing on current emissions as ‘for-
ward-looking’ (Shue, 1999, p. 534), to allay confusion, I opt instead for the term ‘present-oriented.’
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The present-oriented PPP is not only economically valuable, as a 
mechanism for eliminating inefficiencies (Broome, 2012); as a princi-
ple of liability, it also captures an important part of moral and politi-
cal duty. Morally speaking, we want agents to get what they deserve. 
If someone harms or endangers others, we typically believe that agent 
should be held accountable—and this falls to government. As John 
Rawls explains, making agents pay for the ‘full social cost of their action’ 
is an ‘essential task of law and government’ in a just society. Hence, 
he defends a present-oriented PPP, pointing to ‘striking cases of pub-
lic harms, as when industries sully and erode the natural environment.’ 
In such cases, Rawls argues, government must correct the ‘divergence 
between private and social accounting that the market fails to reg-
ister’ (Rawls, 1999, p. 237). In practice, this means pricing emissions 
in a way that reflects the harm they are causing and some estimate of 
the harm they may cause (in the form of a risk premium).12 Such a tax 
would provide a ‘double dividend’13—it would curb emissions (by mak-
ing them more expensive) while providing a revenue stream for financ-
ing adaptation and compensation efforts—making the principle an 
attractive basis for international climate policy.
3  The Case for, and Problems with,  
a Backward-Looking PPP
Despite its appeal, the present-oriented PPP has attracted trenchant 
criticism in recent years. Henry Shue, Eric Neumayer, Simon Caney, 
and others object to its neglect of historical emissions, arguing that 
agents most responsible for the emergence of climate change owe a 
debt of corrective justice to those adversely affected by it (Shue, 1999, 
p. 534ff). These scholars also contend that a purely present-oriented 
PPP unduly burdens developing states, which rely on emissions-heavy 
industrialization to sustain minimal standard-of-living. For these 
12I elaborate this point below.
13See Caney (2010, n. 31; but cf. Stern, 2010, p. 62).
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reasons, they endorse backward-looking PPPs (Caney, 2010; Neumayer, 
2000, pp. 185–192; Moellendorf, 2012),14 which allocate climate 
duties in proportion to cumulative (historical) emissions.
Concerns that a purely present-oriented PPP would heavily bur-
den developing states are not unfounded.15 Using standard accounting 
methods, six of the top ten emitters in 2012 were developing states,16 
and nearly two-thirds of all emissions came from developing and poor 
states. Thus, insofar as a present-oriented PPP ignores historical emis-
sions, it manifests a compound unfairness: It forgives post-industrial 
states their harmful historical emissions while placing heavy burdens 
on those least able to bear them. On this view, corrective justice and 
distributive justice are better served by including historical emissions in 
assessments of responsibility.
3.1  Disappearing Perpetrators
As others have noted, however, this solution is practically and theoret-
ically fraught.17 We can note two commonly cited issues here. First, 
many historical polluters are now dead and therefore cannot be made 
to pay. Forcing their descendants to pay, as Edward Page notes, violates 
the ‘ethos’ of the PPP, which ‘presupposes that only agents that actually 
caused an environmentally adverse outcome can be held’ responsible 
(Page, 2011, p. 415). This is the ‘disappearing perpetrators’ prob-
lem. A commonly proposed solution to this problem is to hold tem-
porally unbounded actors like states responsible. Doing so raises new 
issues. First, many states have undergone one or more revolutions since 
14Note that Shue (1999) does not refer to his principle as a PPP, but—as Caney (2005, p. 753) 
notes—it fits the mold.
15The following is based on measures using the CAIT data set.
16Specifically, China (1), India (3), Russia (4), Indonesia (5), Brazil (6), and Mexico (10). This 
ranking includes emissions from land-use changes and counts any state with a per capita GDP 
below USD $12,000 as ‘developing.’ Notably, several developing states also top the list for per 
capita emissions and post-1990 emissions growth.
17For further critique of backward-looking principles, see Kingston (2014). See also Shue (1999), 
Singer (2002), Caney (2005, 2010), and Page (2011, 2016).
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industrializing. Should states with new constitutions or leadership be 
responsible for the actions of the regimes they supplanted?18 Similarly, 
what of former colonies? (Should emissions generated in Ghana before 
1957 be attributed to the UK or the current government of Ghana?) 
Moreover, unless we take the implausible view that states have agency 
distinct from the human authorities directing them, it also seems prob-
lematic that many former authorities are dead. (For instance, the most 
intense deforestation in the USA occurred between 1850 and 1920 
(MacCleery, 2011, p. xii); are current citizens responsible for those 
land-use changes, despite having no part in authorizing them?) In short, 
making present generations responsible for historically remote emissions 
fails to satisfy the central dictum ‘the polluters should pay’ (Posner & 
Weisbach, 2010, pp. 108–109).19
3.2  Excusable Ignorance
Until the problem of climate change became firmly established scien-
tifically and widely known, all agents—including states—could be said 
to have been acting in ‘excusable ignorance’ of the harm their actions 
(particularly emitting GHGs) were causing. In response to this, Peter 
Singer (2002, p. 34), Eric Neumayer (2000, pp. 181, 189), Henry Shue 
(1999, p. 536), and others have proposed establishing a ‘cut-off date’ 
for excusable ignorance: a date after which knowledge of climate change 
was readily available and thus agents could be held responsible.20 Most 
often, the date proposed is 1990, which is the year the first IPCC report 
was released.
19Also problematically, many (and perhaps most) climate-change victims do not yet exist, since 
grounding corrective-justice claims usually requires establishing an identity between victim and 
wrongdoer.
20Singer and Shue have proposed 1990, while Neumayer suggests the mid-1980s. For critical dis-
cussion, see Caney (2005, pp. 762, 769), Page (2011, p. 415; 2016, p. 93).
18Page (2011, p. 415) argues that it would be inappropriate to hold new governments responsible 
for the actions of former regimes. See also Kingston (2014, p. 284ff), Caney (2006, p. 469ff), and 
Miller (2009, p. 151ff).
166     R. Mittiga
Although this seems a compelling (if only partial21) solution, there 
are two complications. First, the disappearing perpetrators problem still 
applies, if in attenuated form. That is, many ‘knowing’ polluters in the 
period since 1990 have also died. Moreover, many of the people alive 
today are children or were for much of the time since 1990. Assuming 
we cannot hold people accountable for what happens while they are 
(or were) children, the number of fully culpable adults (i.e., those who 
were adults in the year 1990 and are still alive now) is quite small rela-
tive to all those who are alive now or were at some point between 1990 
and today. If our aim is to make the polluters pay, these considerations 
must be taken into account when assigning responsibility—viz., we 
must determine how much of the global stock of atmospheric GHGs is 
attributable to actors no longer alive or who are or were children in the 
period from 1990 to today. This is a daunting, if not impossible, task. 
We might avoid these issues by designating states as the relevant agents, 
but this would raise anew many of the above issues.
Even setting these complications aside, it quickly becomes clear that 
focusing on post-1990 cumulative emissions does little to resolve the 
initial concern with the present-oriented PPP—viz., that it entails eco-
nomically regressive burdens. Indeed, in 2012, five of the top ten states 
for post-1990 historical emissions were developing economies.22
3.3  Modifying the Principle
Many have proposed revisions to the backward-looking PPP to address 
these and other issues. For instance, some advocate a principle of strict 
liability, arguing that agents should be held responsible for emissions 
whether or not they understood the consequences of their actions, or 
even could have known (Gardiner, 2004; Neumayer, 2000; Shue, 1999, 
pp. 531–545). Others charge that strict liability is morally questionable 
21Some resist this move because it curtails the PPP’s reach and thus its ability to serve corrective 
justice (Caney, 2010, p. 209; Page, 2016, p. 93).
22Specifically, (2) China, (3) Russia, (4) India, (7) Brazil, and (10) Mexico. NB: This is the list for 
emissions excluding land-use changes. The list including land-use changes is even more regressive.
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(Caney, 2010; Kingston, 2014, pp. 287–288), however, and likely 
unserviceable as a basis for international climate policy (Baer, 2010, 
p. 248; Bell, 2011; Moellendorf, 2012; Posner & Weisbach, 2010; 
Schüssler, 2011).
Another solution involves importing a notion of ‘benefitting’ into 
the PPP which entails arguing that those who have gained ‘unjustly’ 
from historical emissions ought to pay. Caney, for instance, modifies his 
PPP to hold that ‘if people engage in activities which jeopardise other 
people’s fundamental interests … they should bear the costs of their 
actions even if they were excusably ignorant [provided] they have bene-
fited from those harmful activities ’ (Caney, 2010, p. 210). Shue similarly 
argues that ‘current generations in affluent states with high historical 
emissions are, and future generations probably will be, continuing ben-
eficiaries of earlier industrial activity’—and thus should pay (Gosseries, 
2004; Shue, 1999, p. 536; see also Neuamyer, 2000, p. 189; Page, 
2016). Whether or not this offers a coherent way forward,23 it means 
abandoning the PPP for a BPP, and with it, the central moral intuition 
that those responsible for causing a problem should pay to address it.24 
If we are to preserve this intuition, we must determine whether an alter-
native formulation of the PPP is available—specifically, one that tracks 
a plausible notion of contribution while remaining sensitive to different 
states’ economic capacities.
4  A Revised, Present-Oriented PPP
A properly formulated, present-oriented PPP can accomplish this. 
Recall that the present-oriented PPP stipulates that those who contrib-
ute to climate change should pay for climate action, in proportion to 
their contribution. Thus, the more emissions an agent generates, the 
greater that agent’s burdens should be. Above, we noted the concern 
23I suggest that it does not in Sect. 5.4 (ii).
24Caney (2005, p. 757) recognizes this in an earlier article, but does not register the point against 
himself in the piece quoted above (Caney 2010). For criticisms of the BPP, see Kingston (2014, 
p. 288ff). For a defense, see Page (2016).
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that this entails imposing heavy costs on developing countries (for 
instance, China, India, and Mexico), which generate significant yearly 
emissions.
This concern is valid if we adopt ‘production-based’ emissions 
accounting, which is virtually ubiquitous: It forms the basis of the 
UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol calculations and is almost always used in 
public discussions of national emissions totals (Davis & Caldeira, 2010; 
Peters and Hertwich, 2008b; Steininger et al., 2014). Perhaps because 
of this, production-based accounting (PBA) has attracted little critical 
attention from climate ethicists.25 It is not the only accounting method, 
nor the most normatively compelling.
An increasingly recognized alternative—consumption-based account-
ing (CBA)—traces emissions ‘embodied’26 in trade goods and attributes 
responsibility for those emissions to the country in which the goods are 
consumed. So, for example, using CBA, emissions generated in China 
to produce goods consumed in Norway are attributed to Norway. This 
small modification helps reveal often obscure neocolonial relations, 
whereby rich and powerful states outsource the production of goods 
to countries with cheaper labor markets, and then blame those coun-
tries for having higher emissions profiles. Chinese officials and environ-
mental advocates have expressed particular frustration with this. For 
instance, at a press conference, Qin Gang, China’s Foreign Ministry 
spokesman, once reminded Western news outlets that a ‘lot of what 
you use, wear and eat is produced in China…On the one hand, you 
increase production in China; on the other hand you criticise China 
on the emission reduction issue’ (Scientific American, 2018). Similarly, 
Yang Ailun of Greenpeace China claims that, in the last 30 years, ‘[a]ll 
the West has done is export a great slice of its carbon footprint to China 
and make China the world’s factory’ (Scientific American, 2018).
Taking these outsourced emissions into account could radically trans-
form how we understand state responsibility. As Davis and Caldeira 
25Some in the climate-policy community have raised fairness concerns, however. See Steininger 
et al. (2014, 2016), Davis and Caldeira (2010), Kander et al. (2015).
26IPCC, AR5, WG3, 306; Davis and Caldeira (2010).
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note: ‘Approximately 6.2 gigatonnes (Gt) of CO2, [or] 23% of all CO2 
emissions from fossil-fuel burning [in 2004]…, were emitted during the 
production of goods that were ultimately consumed in a different coun-
try’ (Davis & Caldeira, 2010, p. 5688). Consequently, CBA provides a 
very different picture of national emissions than PBA.
We can see this in the following graph. In Fig. 1, the difference 
between the blue and the green columns for high-income countries, on 
the one hand, and middle- to low-income countries, on the other hand, 
shows that many of the emissions produced by the latter are embodied 
in goods consumed by the former.27 This ‘off-shoring’ of emissions—
from rich to poor and developing countries—is made possible through 
international trade.
Given that the biggest importers of goods from the developing 
world are affluent states, we should expect them to top the list for 
Fig. 1 Distribution of consumption—and production-based emissions
27This follows the World Bank’s state income grouping scheme, in which countries with a GNI 
per capita above USD$12,475 are considered high income. https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/
knowledgebase/articles/906519.
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consumption-based emissions. The data show precisely this.28 In fact, 
in a data set covering 119 countries29 for the year 2013,30 regression 
analysis shows that a state’s GDP was a very strong and statistically 
significant predictor of its total consumption emissions (R2 = 0.76; 
p = 3.62E-38).31 Notably, this relationship is appreciably stronger than 
that between a state’s GDP and its total production emissions.32
Of course, GNI (or GDP) per capita better reflects affluence than 
GNI alone.33 Using this metric, we find that, in 2013, of the 25 coun-
tries with the highest per capita consumption emissions, all (save one, 
Mongolia) had a per capita GNI above $12,475, placing them in the 
World Bank’s highest income bracket.34 Conversely, of the states among 
the lowest 25 per capita consumption emitters in 2013, none had a per 
capita GNI exceeding $2,700 (the average was $1,030.40).35 In short, 
the countries with the highest per capita consumption emissions are 
also the wealthiest.
Furthermore, the top 25 per capita consumption emitters in 
2013 were responsible for 33.46% of all emissions generated that 
year,36 despite representing only 10.64% of the global population.37 
28Emissions data from Peters et al. (2011). Economics and demographic data from World 
Development Indicators (last updated March 1, 2017), supplemented, to include Taiwan, by 
https://eng.stat.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=37408&CtNode=5347&mp=5. All economic information 
is reported in 2016 USD$, unless otherwise stated.
29NB: Poor countries are under-represented in this data set—a tendency among most CBA data 
sets. If they were fully included, the results would likely be even more striking.
30At the time of writing, 2013 is the most recent year for which most data are available.
31Similar results are found for GNI; R2 = 0.74, p = 1.32E-35.
32The data do report a statistically significant correlation between GDP and production-based 
emissions (p = 8.42E-30), but with less explanatory power (R2 = 0.67).
33China and India, for instance, have high GDPs/GNIs but are still relatively poor because of 
their large populations. Because of this, the World Bank uses a per capita measure as the basis of 
its income groupings.
34The average per capita GNI of this group was $42,863.44—almost triple the world average at 
the time, $14,928.37.
35Again, this is even more striking given that the data set excludes many poor and developing 
states.
36The consumption emissions of these states totaled 12,040.71 MtCO2, while global emissions in 
2013 totaled approximately 35,986.20 MtCO2.
37Or 760,609,121 of 7,147,749,368 people.
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Comparatively, the bottom 25 per capita consumption emitters, which 
represent 14.40% of the global population,38 were responsible for just 
1.62% of all emissions.39 This, again, strongly suggests that consump-
tion emissions closely track affluence.
Of course, using a consumption-based emissions accounting method 
effectively means shifting responsibility from producer to consumer 
because the underlying premise of the CBA model is that consumer 
demand (particularly in affluent states) is the proper locus of responsi-
bility. There are several reasons for accepting this view.
For one, it is for the sake of satisfying consumer demand that pro-
ducers undertake emissions-generating activities. Now we might worry 
that while consumer demand gives the reason for production, it does 
not, all else being equal, say anything about how production should be 
conducted—especially, whether producers should employ higher- or 
lower-emission productive processes. That decision, it seems, falls to 
producers. Yet, this might be too hasty. A basic axiom of supply and 
demand (and rational decision theory) is that when deciding between 
identical goods, consumers will, all else being equal, prefer whichever is 
cheapest. There are of course exceptions, carved out by marketing, ethi-
cal considerations, and so on. However, in most cases, price is the surest 
determinant of demand. If this is right, then consumers are, in effect, 
driving a specific kind of production: namely, cheap—which often 
means emissions intensive—production. In other words, consumer 
preferences for cheap goods dictate—in a general, but direct and signifi-
cant way—producers’ decisions about how they produce goods.
There are two additional reasons to hold consumers responsible. 
Affluent, consumerist states are the chief architects of today’s highly 
liberalized trade system and global division of labor, which enables 
multinational firms to offshore high-emitting productive processes. In 
other words, the reason why production proceeds in emissions-insensi-
tive ways is, in an important sense, because the political leadership of 
38Approximately 1,028,951,328 people.
39That is, about 581.86 MtCO2.
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consumerists societies has structured it that way, to ensure an unim-
peded stream of cheap goods. Finally, locating responsibility with 
consumers gives practical expression to the widely shared idea that suc-
cessfully combatting climate change requires the wealthy to undertake 
meaningful lifestyle changes.40 Holding consumers responsible will have 
the result of curbing consumption.
These points notwithstanding, clearly producers bear some responsi-
bility. For in many cases, they have the ability, if not the will, to lower 
their emissions by adopting alternative modes of production. Yet, even 
granting this, two considerations should lead us to be wary about treat-
ing producers as equally responsible as consumers. First, in many if 
not most cases, producers lack an incentive to reduce their emissions 
unilaterally, for doing so would raise the price of their goods and thus 
decrease their market competitiveness. Of course, governmental regula-
tion offers a potential solution to this dilemma: By requiring all pro-
ductive firms in a given territory to lower their emissions, none will 
be made less competitive on that ground. Yet, as Fig. 1 shows, we may 
worry that at precisely the moment stringent emissions-reduction poli-
cies are implemented by any given state, multinational firms will sim-
ply relocate to a country without such restrictions. This dynamic is a 
perverse feature of our global trade system, which, again, was designed 
largely by and for affluent states to ensure access to cheap consumer 
products.
Still, conscientious producers could, for example, use advertis-
ing to instill consumer demand for lower-emissions goods (much as 
organic agricultural suppliers have done for pesticide-free produce), or 
undertake lobbying efforts to create industry-wide regulations, elim-
inating perverse incentives from the decision-making process. To the 
extent, then, that producers have failed to inform consumer prefer-
ences or reform the system, they appear to be fit objects of blame. 
A problem with this view, though, is that successful productive firms 
are often directed by agents who, themselves, are high consumers—for 
40On this, see IPCC, AR5, WG3, 6.8, 7.9, 8.3.5, 8.9, 9.2–9.3, 9.10, 10.4, 11.4, 12.4–12.7, 
15.3–15.5.
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consumption largely tracks wealth at the individual level, just as it does 
on the international level.41 This suggests another layer of perverse 
incentives. Calling on the leaders of productive firms to reform them-
selves or their industries is, in effect, calling on the most prodigious 
global consumers to make their own consumption more expensive.
Taking all of this into account, it seems that, on balance, there is a 
stronger case for holding consumers responsible. Doubtlessly, though, 
there are relevant counter-examples and exceptions in particular cases 
and contexts. For this reason, we might conclude that the best account-
ing method would be one capable of isolating the relative causal impact 
of consumers and producers, and assigning ‘shares’ of responsibility. 
Parsing the causal impacts of consumers versus producers, however, is— 
philosophically and practically—infeasible (Steininger et al., 2014, p. 78).
We must therefore pick between second-best methods and attrib-
ute responsibility accordingly. In other words, choosing between PBA 
and CBA is less a matter of which method better captures contribution 
(which both do imperfectly), but of which performs better with respect 
to pertinent ethical factors: especially, fairness, environmental effi-
cacy, and cost-effectiveness. I argue that CBA is superior in these three 
regards and thus provides the most ethically compelling basis for allo-
cating climate burdens.
4.1  Fairness
As already noted, CBA and PBA offer starkly different views of national 
emissions: CBA provides a lower-emissions count for lower- and mid-
dle-income countries, and a proportionally higher one for affluent 
states.42 In this way, CBA satisfies what we might call the convergence 
view in the literature: that the rich ought to pay for climate action 
(Gardiner, 2004, p. 579). For, as shown above, a significant and robust 
correlation exists between GNI (per capita) and consumption emissions 
41It is for this reason that Rawls (1999, pp. 199, 246) prefers consumption-based over income-
based taxation at the domestic level.
42This finding is affirmed also in the most recent IPCC report (AR5, WG3, 127).
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(per capita). This relationship is stronger on a present-oriented CBA 
model than a PBA model. Moreover, the same data used above show 
that there is no statistically significant relationship between per capita 
GNI and (post-1990) historical production-based emissions.43 In other 
words, contemporary affluence is not a good predictor of cumulative 
production emissions. This suggests that those who propose counting 
historical emissions to satisfy the convergence view would do better to 
advocate a present-oriented, consumption-based PPP.
One might object that imposing a border tax (or tariff) in accordance 
with a present-oriented CPP would unfairly harm those in developing 
states, which are net exporters. I address several versions of the unfair-
ness objection in Sects. 5.1 and 5.2. We can address the trade objection 
here, however. This objection can be more formally stated as follows:
a. If universally (or nearly universally) implemented greenhouse gas 
taxes are necessary, as most believe, to combat climate change 
successfully44;
b. and if such taxes necessarily dampen trade, thereby negatively affect-
ing developing states,
c. then we must choose between temporarily depressing international 
trade and addressing climate change.
There are strong reasons to doubt (b), or at least the provision that 
depressed trade must come at the cost of those in developing states. 
Through international aid programs, guaranteed minimum trade deals, 
international investments in green infrastructure, etc., any negative 
trade effects brought on by greenhouse gas taxes could be significantly 
mitigated or even reversed.
Yet, even granting (b), we should note that failing to address cli-
mate change now will almost certainly depress economic activ-
ity in the future, especially in poor and developing states, which are 
43Regression analysis between GNI per capita and cumulative production emissions since 1990 
returns a p-value of 0.18—far below any significant threshold.
44I defend this point in the next subsection.
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disproportionately vulnerable to environmental changes. Furthermore, 
this harm would likely far exceed any foregone welfare gains related to 
greenhouse taxes.45
Suppose then that we are justified in imposing greenhouse gas taxes 
today.46 The question then becomes: Is it fairer to place greenhouse gas 
taxes directly on producers or consumers? Although under ideal condi-
tions there should be no difference, in our fragmented global system, 
placing taxes on consumption will more likely ensure that the rich 
pay—because, again, net consumption (consumption in excess of pro-
duction) increases in rough proportion to wealth. Thus, a consump-
tion-based model appears to be economically fairer.
4.2  Environmental Efficacy
Understanding environmental efficacy in terms of a principle’s or pol-
icy’s ability to ‘reduce the causes and impacts of climate change,’47 
CBA has a crucial advantage: It can help prevent ‘carbon leakage.’ 
Carbon leakage, in both ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ variants, is the by-product 
of international free-trade agreements and fragmented mitigation poli-
cies. Strong leakage occurs when unilateral mitigation policies prompt 
domestic, polluting firms to relocate offshore.48 Weak or ‘consump-
tion-induced’ leakage arises from the global division of labor, which, 
today, concentrates production in states with energy-inefficient infra-
structure.49 In both cases, reductions in emissions in one state are offset 
by equal or greater increases in another.
Carbon leakage poses a problem for PBA so long as mitigation pol-
icies are not unified and there is not a single price for carbon enforced 
45I return to this point below, via Rendall (2011).
46I provide a much fuller defense of this point in Mittiga (2018).
47IPCC, AR5, WG3, pp. 1009, 236.
48According to the IPCC: ‘Carbon leakage is…the increase in CO2 emissions outside the coun-
tries taking domestic mitigation action divided by the reduction in the emissions of these coun-
tries’ (AR4, WG3, Chapter 11.7.2).
49On weak vs. strong, see Steininger et al. (2014, pp. 76, 79ff), Peters and Hertwich (2008a), 
Droege (2011), IPCC, AR5, WG3, p. 386.
176     R. Mittiga
internationally. For whenever emissions-producing activities are relo-
cated to states with less stringent policies, regulation is undermined. 
To clarify, imagine state X imposes and strictly enforces a tax on green-
house gas emissions, while state Y does not. Assuming a lack of trade 
barriers between X and Y, we can expect that X’s policy will induce 
some heavily polluting companies to relocate to Y, and simply export 
back the goods they produce there. In this way, the emissions X sought 
to curtail continue, unabated. Certainly, PBA can (and will) reflect 
lower national emissions for X, but the aim is to reduce global emis-
sions, not those of any particular state (except in an intermediate sense).
Even within a fragmented system, CBA can combat this: Through 
the medium of international trade, state X can enforce mitigation poli-
cies (such as a price on GHGs) outside its borders by applying tariffs to 
imported products. Economists call such tariffs ‘border carbon adjust-
ments’; they work by adjusting imported-product prices to reflect the 
social costs of greenhouse gas emissions embodied within them (Brooks, 
2015; Steininger et al., 2014, p. 76). By subjecting all goods exported 
from states that lack (sufficiently stringent) mitigation policies to emis-
sions taxes as a condition of market participation, CBA is able to deter 
free-riding. By minimizing or preventing carbon leakage in this way, 
CBA increases the efficacy of mitigation efforts undertaken by any trad-
ing state.
4.3  Cost-Effectiveness
By ‘bringing the export sectors of the developing and emerging econo-
mies’ that affluent states trade with ‘into the scope of [the latter’s] pol-
icy,’ CBA also has an advantage in cost-effectiveness (Steininger et al., 
2014, p. 81). In other words, CBA is able to capture a broader share of 
global emissions and because the costs of mitigation increase with the 
fraction of total emissions abated, this means that CBA will help iden-
tify cheaper mitigation targets. This is an example of declining marginal 
costs: It is cheaper and easier to reduce emissions in countries that have 
not decarbonized much or at all—which is the case in many developing 
states—and more difficult and expensive to reduce emissions in states  
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that are already decarbonizing—which is the case for many  affluent 
states (Barrett, 1998; Steininger et al., 2014, p. 81; Stern, 2007). 
In other words, by making consumers responsible for the emissions 
embodied in trade goods, we incentivize emissions-reduction efforts in 
net-exporting countries, which can often be less costly than comparable 
reductions efforts in net-importing countries.
4.4  Additional Considerations
A present-oriented, consumption-based PPP offers two further advan-
tages. First, it is sensitive to changing economic fates. As developing 
states become wealthier, it is essential that they commit more resources 
to combatting climate change. The consumption-based PPP can explain 
why, and to what extent, they should contribute. A backward-looking 
principle cannot do this; nor can it accommodate economic decline. 
For on a backward-looking principle, present circumstances matter little 
if at all. Insofar as consumption emissions decrease in accordance with 
economic capacity, a consumption-based, present-oriented PPP offers 
security: Should the rich become poor, or the poor rich, burdens change 
accordingly.
Second, as Davis and Caldeira note, ‘to the extent that constraints on 
emissions in developing countries are the major impediment to effective 
international climate policy, allocating responsibility for some portion 
of these emissions to final consumers elsewhere may represent an oppor-
tunity for compromise’ (Davis & Caldeira, 2010, p. 5690). In other 
words, a consumption-based PPP may facilitate negotiations by ensur-
ing that the poor will not be punished for production, and that the rich 
will shoulder the greatest burdens without being held liable for histori-
cal emissions—something they have dearly attempted to avoid.
4.5  Summary
In short, a present-oriented, consumption-based PPP better satisfies the 
convergence view that the rich ought to pay for climate action, and is 
more environmentally effective. It is also more sensitive to changing 
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economic fates and may prove more politically feasible than alternatives. 
However, it is not free from problems. In what follows, I examine four 
potential objections concerning the applicability of the principle and 
its effects on the global poor. To avoid confusion with alternative PPPs, 
hereafter the present-oriented, consumption-based PPP is referred to as 
the consumer-pays principle, or CPP.
5  Objections
The first two objections elaborate on a concern expressed above: that 
present-oriented principles, like the CPP, unduly burden poor and 
developing states. I reject this concern in one form but accept it in 
another, which leads me to endorse a qualifying principle that limits the 
CPP’s application and provides protections for economically disadvan-
taged states.
The latter two objections charge that the CPP is incomplete. One of 
these charges holds, and I respond by supplementing the CPP with an 
ability-to-pay principle (APP). The end result of these modifications is 
a pluralist, bi-phasic account of international climate justice, which is 
outlined below.
5.1  Unfair to the Global Poor (i): The CPP Does  
not Secure ‘just Entitlements’ to Emit
A popular view—defended (in various forms) by Baer, Neumayer, 
Caney, Jamieson, Singer, and others—is that everyone has an equal 
‘right’ to generate a certain amount of emissions,50 with quotas defined 
by the total absorptive capacity of the climate system divided by the 
number of people alive today (Caney, 2012; Gardiner, 2004, p. 583). 
On this view, the global rich, who have exceeded their quota, should 
50See Gardiner (2004, p. 583ff), Caney (2005, p. 770; 2012), Neumayer (2000, pp. 185–192), 
Athanasiou and Baer (2002, pp. 76–97), Agarwal and Narain (1991), Jamieson (2001), Singer 
(2002, pp. 39–40), and Baer (2002). Politically, this view has been advocated by China, India 
and many less developed states.
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pay for climate action, while the global poor, who are ‘in credit,’51 are 
entitled to further emissions (or owed compensation). Those taking this 
view might charge that, insofar as the CPP lacks a theory of just entitle-
ments, it deprives the developing world of its ‘fair share’ of the atmos-
pheric commons.
Although the intuitions behind claims about equal rights to emit 
appear generally sound, they become problematic in the particular con-
text of climate change.52 Given the extent to which climate change has 
already progressed, it is difficult, in consequentialist terms at least, to 
distinguish a right to emit from a right to harm. Simply too many emis-
sions have been generated for fossil-fuel-based development to continue 
safely. Indeed, global mean temperatures will continue to increase as the 
total stock of GHGs in the atmosphere increases. Already atmospheric 
CO2-e concentration levels have reached unprecedented and dangerous 
levels—as of February 2018, atmospheric CO2-e exceeded 407 ppm, 
well above the commonly cited ‘safe’ upper limit of 350 ppm.53 All new 
emissions beyond the earth’s natural sequestration capacity can only 
compound the harmful effects of climate change.
One might respond here by emphasizing the relationship between emis-
sions and standard-of-living—that is, by insisting that people must emit to 
sustain a minimally satisfactory life. Shue, for instance, defends a right to 
‘subsistence emissions’ (Shue, 1993)—characterized as emissions necessary 
for securing a person’s ‘vital interests’ (Shue, 1999, p. 541)54—and argues 
that this right places a duty on the rich to reduce their ‘luxury emissions.’ 
If this duty is observed, Shue and others argue, poor states could emit 
without jeopardizing current or future generations.
This response contains a fallacy, however: It conflates the right 
to a certain quality of life with a right to emit. Of course, until very 
51Because ‘their cumulative emissions are smaller than the global average per capita absorption’ 
(IPCC, 1995, p. 94; quoted in Gardiner, 2004, p. 584).
52For additional criticisms, see Gardiner (2004, p. 583ff).
53Notably, according to ice-core samples, levels never exceeded 300 ppm in at least the last 
800,000 years, and before the Industrial Revolution, CO2e concentrations were around 280 ppm 
(Lüthi et al., 2008).
54Caney (2005) also adopts a vital-interest argument in defending a right to emit.
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recently, emissions and standard-of-living were tightly correlated, such 
that increases in emissions were necessary to generate economic gains 
and thereby improve aggregate welfare. This relationship is not as rigid 
today as breakthroughs in renewable energy have made affordable, 
 carbon-neutral development possible (Delucchi & Jacobson, 2011). To 
be sure, fossil-fuel industrialization may (in some cases) still offer the 
most expedient or inexpensive means for realizing welfare gains, but 
the desire to secure a certain standard-of-living does not justify using 
any means available. Moral prohibitions against harming must also be 
respected. That other states achieved development through fossil-fuel 
industrialization does not alter this, as merely citing the wrongdoing of 
others is insufficient for establishing standards of right or fairness.55
We should therefore reject claims about a right to emit founded on 
the right to a decent standard-of-living. Emitting GHGs in excess of the 
earth’s absorptive capacity is harmful, and activities that unnecessarily56 
cause emissions should be limited if not prohibited.
5.2  Unfair to the Global Poor (ii):  
The CPP Is Not Poverty Sensitive
One might concede that a right to emit is problematic but still argue 
that the CPP is insensitive to developing states’ interests—or sensitive 
only in a contingent way. For while a focus on consumption emissions 
tends to place the biggest burdens on the wealthiest states, should a poor 
country have high consumption emissions, as some (albeit not many) 
do, the CPP will impose correspondingly large burdens. Such burdens 
would jeopardize some states’ ability to realize or maintain a decent 
standard-of-living (Caney, 2010, p. 213; see also Shue, 1999, 542). 
55This would be a tu quoque fallacy.
56Unnecessarily can be interpreted in two ways here: (1) activities that contribute to climate 
change but are unnecessary for a satisfactory life (such as eating carbon-intensive foods, like meat 
and dairy products, when a plant-based diet is nutritionally sufficient and widely available) and 
(2) activities that are necessary for a satisfactory life but are undertaken in ways that unnecessarily 
result in greenhouse gas emissions (such as producing energy with coal or fracked gas when effec-
tive and clean alternatives like solar and wind are available).
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The CPP should thus stipulate that climate-action burdens shall not 
undermine any state’s ability to secure decent standard-of-living for its 
citizens.57
A few things to note about this proposed revision. First, while many 
argue that environmental-justice should not neglect broader distribu-
tive-justice concerns,58 we must consider the possibility that combat-
ing climate change may not always comport with addressing economic 
injustice.59 It is also possible that, given climate change’s catastrophic 
potential, intergenerational justice may require deprioritizing today’s 
global poor for the sake of future generations. Matthew Rendall (2011, 
pp. 891, 885), for instance, argues that while ‘policies that deprived the 
poor of necessities so that the rich could continue their ‘luxury emis-
sions’ … would be a crying injustice,’ this ‘would be a lesser injustice 
than risking long-term catastrophe,’ because ‘the prospect of condemn-
ing several more generations in the South to poverty—terrible in 
itself—dwindles next to the danger of permanent impoverishment.’60 In 
other words, so long as unabated climate change threatens the essential 
interests of future generations in a more intense or enduring way than 
poverty affects today’s global poor, justice may require us to prioritize 
addressing the former ahead of the latter.
Yet, accepting this does not alter the basic intuition that  allocating 
climate-action burdens in a way that unnecessarily undermines suffi-
cient standard-of-living is unjust. Fortunately, there appears to be no 
strong reason to assume that responding to climate change must come 
at the cost of intra-generational economic justice (Gardiner, 2006; 
Rendall 2011; Singer, 2010, pp. 186, 55). The thrust of the objection 
must still be answered, then: Ideally, fair allocations of climate burdens  
57I set aside the question of what counts as a sufficient minimum. Shue (1999, p. 541) defines 
it as ‘enough for a decent chance for a reasonably healthy and active life of more or less normal 
length,’ which extends beyond bare survival to those goods necessary for ‘a distinctively human, 
if modest, life.’ For other thresholds, see Shue (1993), Caney (2005, 2010, p. 218), and Singer 
(2002).
58Shue (1999), Caney (2005, 2012, pp. 258–259). But cf. Posner and Weisbach (2010).
59Posner and Weisbach (2010) stress this. I also take up this point in Mittiga (2018).
60Rendall (2011) later argues that imposing costs on poor states is probably unnecessary, assum-
ing it is possible to shift the burdens of climate change onto future generations.
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should strictly track contribution to the problem and be sensitive to 
capacity.61 The CPP succeeds on the first front, but not necessarily on 
the second because it tends to impose greater burdens on rich states but 
is not constitutionally committed to this.
To meet this objection, we must recognize a qualifying principle 
external to the CPP. This principle presupposes a distinction between 
climate action itself and the costs of that action. For example, if the 
CPP results in the imposition of a universal carbon tax, this qualifying 
principle might hold that, at regular intervals, more advantaged states 
have a duty to provide tax rebates to less advantaged states. We can call 
this principle the economic justice qualifying principle (or EJQP). It 
can be expressed alongside the CPP as follows:
CPP: Climate-action burdens should be allocated in proportion to 
contribution, measured in terms of each state’s annual consumption 
emissions.
EJQP: However, wealthy states62 have a duty, in proportion to 
their wealth, to ensure that climate-action costs do not unneces-
sarily compromise any state’s ability to attain or preserve decent 
standard-of-living.
One need not accept a thick cosmopolitan ethic to endorse the EJQP; 
rather, one need only to maintain that it is wrong to harm others, wher-
ever they are in the world.63 The IPCC’s Third Assessment Report stresses 
that ‘[a]ny individuals’ or nations’ actions to address the climate-change 
issue, even the largest emitting nation acting alone, can have only a 
small effect.’64 In other words, each state requires the cooperation of all 
or most others to mitigate climate change successfully. Consequently, 
attempting to structure international climate action in a way that 
61This idea is reflected in the ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ doctrine (UNFCCC, 1).
62In this context, ‘wealthy’ refers to states belonging to the World Bank’s ‘high-income’ and 
‘upper middle-income’ groups. For an inventory of these states, and of those in the ‘lower middle’ 
and ‘low-income’ groups, see IPCC, AR5, WG3, A.II.2.3, pp. 1287–1288.
63The argument in this paragraph draws on Shue (1999, p. 541ff).
64IPCC, AR3, WG3, 607. See also IPCC, AR5, WG3, pp. 5, 214, 136.
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unnecessarily undermines the realization or preservation of a decent 
minimum standard-of-living in developing states amounts to a will to 
harm—provided, as Shue notes, ‘that interfering with people’s ability to 
maintain a minimum for themselves count[s] as a serious harm’ (Shue, 
1999, p. 542). Put more simply, if forcing the least advantaged to sac-
rifice is unnecessary, it is also harmful and unfair, regardless of other 
considerations.
Note, however, that this does not relieve poor and developing states 
of their climate-action responsibilities—it does not imply, for instance, 
that poor states are entitled to delay mitigation policies. Poor and devel-
oping states, like all states, have duties not to exacerbate climate change, 
but satisfying this duty can rightly be predicated on more advantaged 
states fulfilling their obligation, specified by the EJQP, to ensure that 
the strains of international cooperation do not unnecessarily compro-
mise the vital interests of the least well off.
5.3  Incomplete (i): The CPP Cannot Ground  
Duties to Enhance Carbon Sinks
Simon Caney distinguishes between ‘atomist’ and ‘holist’ accounts of 
climate justice. Atomist accounts offer a separate and distinct principle 
for each climate burden (such as mitigation, adaptation, and compen-
sation), whereas holist accounts treat climate burdens ‘en masse,’ with 
a single principle (Caney, 2012, pp. 258–259).65 I have presented my 
account as holist. One might challenge this, however, on the grounds 
that the CPP is fundamentally aimed at discouraging bads (such as the 
generation of greenhouse gas emissions), not promoting goods, and 
thus cannot provide for the enhancement of carbon sinks, like forests 
and certain marine habitats (Armstrong, 2016; Duarte et al., 2013; 
Page, 2016, p. 85). Thus, for any account to be truly holist, it must be 
able to offer a principled basis for ensuring that sinks are properly main-
tained and duly expanded.
65Caney also notes that there can be intermediate accounts covering some but not all climate 
burdens.
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Although this is a serious objection, a simple response may be avail-
able. With estimates of the annual sequestration capacity of particu-
lar forests and marine habitats, credits could be awarded to the states 
maintaining them. This would simply require regarding the sinks as 
consumable goods that provide annual returns (in the form of carbon 
sequestration capacity)—a kind of rent-deriving property.
Several advantages would follow from this. First, providing credits for 
sinks would open a stream of benefits for poor and developing states, 
thereby correcting for the disproportionate burdens they currently bear 
in preserving what are, after all, collective goods (Armstrong, 2016; 
Page, 2016, p. 89). Relatedly, if an international market was established 
in which the rights to these credits could be leased, poor and develop-
ing states could secure direct financial transfers from wealthy states seek-
ing to lower their yearly emissions totals, without ceding control of the 
territories hosting the sinks. Second, awarding credits would incentivize 
the maintenance and expansion of carbon sinks. Indeed, a credit system 
effectively doubles the value of a sink since razing a forest would entail 
both losing a credit (equivalent to the sequestration capacity) and incur-
ring a fee (equivalent to the carbon emitted from the land-use change). 
These calculations may seem complex, but factoring sequestration cred-
its and land-use changes into national emissions estimates is already 
common practice; thus, incorporating them into a consumption-based 
model poses no insuperable difficulties.
5.4  Incomplete (ii): The CPP Cannot Allocate  
Burdens Without Human Pollution
The final objection is that the CPP cannot provide a coherent basis for 
allocating climate-action burdens in two important cases: when human 
activity (i) is not or (ii) is no longer driving climate change.
5.4.1  Anthropogenic and Non-anthropogenic Climate Change
Consider, first, the IPCC’s claim (cited in Caney, 2010, p. 211) that 
‘most of the warming observed over the last 50 years is attributable to 
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human activities.’ As this implies, other natural processes also contrib-
ute to global warming, if in a far less pronounced way. This poses a 
problem for the CPP. Specifically, because the CPP allocates burdens in 
proportion to contribution, distinguishing between anthropogenic and 
non-anthropogenic climate change seems necessary. In making this dis-
tinction, however, another problem arises: The CPP appears unable to 
address non-anthropogenic climate change.66
In response, we should first note that non-anthropogenic climate 
change would almost certainly not be a cause for concern were it not for 
our gross exacerbation of the problem (US Environmental Protection 
Agency). Given this, polluters should be held responsible for the prob-
lem as a whole. We know (and have known for decades) that climate 
change is real and that human activity is causing changes that almost 
certainly would not have occurred without our interference. In this 
sense, when we contribute to climate change, in awareness of what our 
actions entail, this confers on us a general responsibility for the out-
comes that follow, even if the problem might have occurred, to some 
extent, without our interference.
Moreover, by dint of being present oriented, the CPP has a more 
expansive notion of contribution—one that includes damages caused 
and risk imposed. That is, when internalizing an activity’s social costs, 
the CPP includes a ‘risk premium,’ which reflects the magnitude and 
likelihood that damages or losses associated with that activity will come 
to pass. Notably, such risks need not be caused exclusively by human 
activity. If a given risk is great enough, society may simply wish to 
ensure that all activities contributing to it are discouraged or stopped. 
Consequently, distinguishing between anthropogenic and non-anthro-
pogenic climate change is unnecessary. A reasonable aversion to risk 
in general, and the knowledge that human activities are increasing the 
likelihood or potential magnitude of a given risk, suffices for grounding 
responsibility.
66Caney (2010, p. 211) registers a version of these concerns against his backward-looking PPP.
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5.4.2  Climate Change Without Polluters
The second charge—that the CPP cannot allocate shares of responsibil-
ity once human activity ceases to contribute to climate change—is more 
difficult to address. Consider the following. If the CPP is successful, 
emission flows will decline, perhaps falling below the earth’s sequestra-
tion capacity before long. Yet, even with an immediate and precipi-
tous emissions drop, climate change may continue to cause problems 
for centuries to come. This, again, is because many GHGs endure in 
the atmosphere long after they are emitted.67 Consequently, distrib-
uting the costs of adaptation and compensation will likely remain an 
important international issue well after we reach the point of carbon 
neutrality. Given that the CPP allocates duties in proportion to present 
contribution, however, it seems inapplicable during a ‘post-mitigation’ 
period. As emissions decline, eventually the revenue the CPP gener-
ates from justly priced taxes on GHGs will be insufficient for covering 
the expenses related to adaptation and compensation. Thus, the CPP is 
incomplete.
Answering this objection requires supplementing the CPP with a 
principle that can explain how to correct for any deficits between the 
revenue generated by taxing emissions and the total cost of climate- 
action burdens for any given year. There are two clear possibilities: a 
BPP and an APP.
Recall that a BPP assigns burdens to those who have benefitted from 
the activities that gave rise to climate change, in proportion to their 
benefit (Page, 2016). While this seems plausible within intermedi-
ate time horizons, it becomes incoherent when applied to the distant 
future. Recall that climate change will likely persist far after the point 
that dangerous emissions are generated. What would a BPP commit us 
to? Would it be fair, 500 years from today, to hold a completely car-
bon-neutral country responsible for the remaining burdens of climate 
action because of the benefits its citizens once received from fossil-fuel 
67For instance, while about 60% of carbon dioxide (CO2)—the most common GHG—will cycle 
out of the atmosphere within 200 years after being released, up to 20% will remain for ‘tens of 
thousands of years’ (Hausfather, 2010).
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industrialization? Would it matter if economic fates shift over this 
time—if a once-rich country becomes relatively poor, for instance? 
What if it is no longer a state at all? As time progresses, these questions 
compound, making the BPP less and less coherent.
We might attempt to preempt these issues by isolating the stream of 
wealth directly generated by greenhouse gas emissions and using this 
as the limit of liability. Page, for instance, argues that responsibility 
under the BPP ought to end at the point that the ‘benefits traceable to 
activities that drive climate change are exhausted’ (Page, 2016, p. 91). 
Isolating the particular benefits derived from climate-inducing activities 
would be a tremendous practical challenge.68 Assuming this could be 
done, however, we might wonder what to do when the limit is reached. 
Given the long atmospheric lives of many GHGs, it is possible that this 
stream of wealth will be exhausted well before adaptation and compen-
sation are no longer concerns. If this is right, then the BPP will itself 
have to be supplemented, thus raising again the original problem.
A more parsimonious—and less theoretically fraught—solution 
would be to supplement the CPP with the APP, which again holds that 
the wealthy should pay proportionately for the costs of climate action. 
Darrell Moellendorf, Caney, Page, and others have used the APP to 
supplement the central principles in their accounts (typically a back-
ward-looking PPP or BPP) (Caney, 2005, 2010; Moellendorf, 2002, 
pp. 97–100; Page, 2011; Shue, 1999). This seems appropriate here as 
well. In other words, in a post-mitigation phase of climate change, the 
APP likely offers the most coherent basis for allocating climate duties.
6  Conclusion
We now have a pluralist, bi-phasic account of climate justice, the three 
pillars of which are as follows:
68How can we isolate a benefit that arose from activities that cause climate change from those 
resulting from, e.g. sea access, education investments, or luck? An agent’s economic success is 
predicated on numerous factors, a mere inventory of which would be confounding.
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CPP: Climate-action burdens should be allocated in proportion to 
contribution, measured in terms of each state’s annual consumption 
emissions.
EJQP: However, wealthy states have a duty, in proportion to their 
wealth, to ensure that climate-action costs do not unnecessar-
ily compromise any state’s ability to attain or preserve a decent 
standard-of-living.
APP: Once consumption emissions decrease to the point that the rev-
enue gained from taxing them can no longer sustain the remaining 
costs (related to adaptation and compensation claims), wealthy states 
should shoulder those burdens in proportion to their wealth.
While this account is not as picturesque as one that simply holds ‘the 
polluter should pay,’ it is markedly more coherent; and, because it covers 
all the relevant climate burdens, now and into the future, it is also more 
comprehensive. Moreover, the account is alive to both the contributions 
and capacities of different actors in both phases. In particular, the first 
phase of the account, covered by the CPP and EJQP, is contribution 
determined and capacity sensitive, while the latter phase, covered by 
the APP, is determined by and sensitive to capacity. In this regard, it is 
responsive to the claims of both compensatory and distributive justice.
Several questions remain. For instance, should historical emissions 
after the excusable ignorance cut-off date be taken into account and, if 
so, how? Should the CPP apply at the subnational level? And to what 
extent, if any, should we discount future welfare when setting emissions 
tax rates? These questions must be addressed in future work. The aim 
here, however, has been simply to show that the PPP (qua CPP) can 
provide a politically feasible, ethically compelling, and environmentally 
effective basis for allocating climate burdens among states.
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